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Abstract
The ongoing debate over net neutrality covers a broad set of issues
related to the regulation of public networks. In two ways, we extend an
idealized usage-priced game-theoretic framework based on a common
linear demand-response model [1]. First, we study the impact of “side
payments” among a plurality of Internet service (access) providers and
content providers. In the non-monopolistic case, our analysis reveals
an interesting “paradox” of side payments in that overall revenues are
reduced for those that receive them. Second, assuming different appli-
cation types (e.g., HTTP web traffic, peer-to-peer file sharing, media
streaming, interactive VoIP), we extend this model to accommodate
differential pricing among them in order to study the issue of appli-
cation neutrality. Revenues for neutral and non-neutral pricing are
compared for the case of two application types.
1 Introduction
Different issues have been raised in the context of the net neutrality debate.
For Tim Berners-Lee [2], it means that “if I pay to connect to the Net with
a certain quality of service, and you pay to connect with that or greater
quality of service, then we can communicate at that level.” For Tim Wu
[17], the main idea is that “a maximally useful public information network
aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally.” According to [7],
it “usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only
once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and
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do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines
to end users.”
These definitions raise different questions, including connectivity, non-
discrimination of application, based on type or origin, and network access
pricing. Net neutrality is a subject involving a range of issues regarding the
regulation of public networks [5]: (a) content neutrality, (b) blocking and
rerouting, (c) denying IP-network interconnection, (d) network management,
and (e) premium service fees. (b) pertains to providers discriminating packets
in favor of their own or affiliated content, while (c) is related to agreements
between last-mile and backbone providers. (d) has been a central argument
for ISPs protesting the enforcement of net neutrality principles: they defend
their right to manage their own networks, especially in order to deal with
congestion issues (e.g., due to high-volume peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic, see the
“Comcast v. the FCC” decision [6]). They claim that regulations would act
as a disincentive for capacity expansion of their networks.
In this paper, considering usage-based revenues, we address issues from
topic (a): side payments among providers and application neutrality. Mas-
sive copyright infringements led copyright holders to seek remuneration from
ISPs, while congestion due to P2P file sharing led some providers to adopt
not application-neutral policies (e.g., Comcast throttling BitTorrent traf-
fic) and to consider usage pricing (as a congestion penalty, for overage of a
monthly quota, or for premium service, e.g., [10]). In what follows, we study
side payments (from Internet Service (access) Providers (ISPs) to Content
Providers (CPs), or in the reverse direction) and consider the impact of not
application-neutral pricing independent of congestion.
That is, we assume consumers are, to some extent, willing to pay usage-
dependent fees. Providers are then competing to settle on their usage-based
prices, their goal being to maximize revenues coming from these charges.
Note that a null price in the following does not mean a provider has no
income, but rather that all their monthly revenues come from flat-rate priced
service components. Study of the flat-rate regime is, however, out of the
scope of this paper. See, e.g., [9] for a comparison of both regimes for a
simple model of congestion management.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in
subsection 1.1 and describe our problem framework in section 2. In section 3,
we study the impact of side payments on the competition between providers.
We extend our framework in section 4 to analyze the effect of not application-
neutral pricing by the ISPs. We conclude in section 5 and discuss future
2
work.
1.1 Related Work
Previously, we considered certain net neutrality related issues like side pay-
ments and premium service fees (e), limiting our consideration to monopolis-
tic providers [1]. In the following, we extend this model to include competi-
tion between multiple identical providers (actually based on an idea sketched
in Section IV of [1]).
The validity of the ISPs’ argument that net neutrality is a disincentive
for bandwidth expansion has been studied in [4]. In the proposed framework,
incentives for broadband providers to expand infrastructure capacity turned
out to be higher under net neutrality, with ISPs tending to under- or over-
invest in the non-neutral regime.
Ma et al. [11, 12] advocate the use of Shapley values as a fair way to
share profits between providers. This approach yields Pareto optimality for
all players, and expects in particular CPs, many of whom receive advertis-
ing revenues, to take part in network-capacity investments. However, this
approach is coalitional and there are many obstacles to its real-life imple-
mentation.
[8] deals with the question of side payments and deploys a framework in
which CPs can subsidize consumers’ connectivity costs. The authors compare
an unregulated regime with a “net neutral” one where restrictions apply on
the maximum price ISPs can charge content providers. They find out that,
even in the neutral case, CPs can benefit from sharing revenue from end users
if the latter are sufficiently price sensitive (and the cost of connectivity is low
enough). Their framework is insightful, but does not take CP revenues into
consideration.
In [13], the authors address whether local ISPs should be allowed to
charge remote CPs for the “right” to reach their end users (again, this is
the side payment issue). Through study of a two-sided market, they deter-
mine when neutrality regulations are harmful depending on the parameters
characterizing advertising rates and consumer price sensitivity1.
We study a similar issue in section 3, yet with a significantly different
scenario. In [13], the ISPs invest in network infrastructure, and then the
1As in [8], the outcome essentially depends on end users’ price sensitivity, but here it
is furthermore related to CP (advertising) revenues.
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CPs invest depending on the quality of the resulting network. The difference
in time and scale of these investments justifies a leader-follower dynamics.
Now in our model we suppose that the network is already deployed and that
providers are setting up usage-based pricing to leverage ongoing revenues.
For example, our scenario could be AT&T beginning to charge Google2 and
its customers on a usage-based basis, while the leader-follower scenario would
be closer to ISPs investing in optical fiber connections and high-quality video-
on-demand providers coming to the new market.
Otherwise, both models share some assumptions, including a fixed num-
ber of players, homogeneous providers, and a uniform distribution of con-
sumers among providers once the price war has ended. However, our CPs’
revenues come from usage-based fees rather than advertising3, and our con-
tent consumption model is different: users subscribe to one CP and get all
their content from him. This could be the case, e.g., with online newspapers,
music stores, video on demand, etc. Though this setting is more restrictive
than a network where users are willing to access all CPs, it is of practical use
and fits more to the homogeneity assumption.
The net neutrality debate is discussed in [14] in light of historical prece-
dents, especially dealing with the question of price discrimination. A conclu-
sion about the way customers value the network is that connectivity is far
more important than content.
2 Problem set-up
Our model encompasses three types of players: the Internauts (end users),
modeled collectively by their demand response, n1 last-mile ISPs, and n2 CPs.
Consumers pay providers usage-dependent fees for service and content that
requires one ISP and one CP. Providers then compete in a game to settle
on their usage-based prices, which may turn out to be 0$/byte, i.e., only
flat-rate fees would apply.
2An intention they voiced, e.g., in [3]: “Now what [the content providers] would like to
do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this
capital and we have to have a return on it.”
3We suggest in 5.1 how to take both into account.
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2.1 Common Demand Response Model
Let us denote by p1i ≥ 0 (resp. p2j ≥ 0) the usage-based price of the ith ISP
(resp. jth CP). These prices act as disincentives on consumers’ demand for
content and bandwidth. We model this with a simple linear response: the
amount users are ready to consume, given that they chose ISP i and CP j,
is
D(p1i, p2j) = Dmax − d1p1i − d2p2j,
where dk is the demand sensitivity to price paid to provider of type k (the
first subscript k = 1 for ISP and k = 2 for CP). We are dealing here with a
set of homogeneous users sharing the same response to price variations. The
parameter Dmax reflects demand under pure flat-rate pricing.
Note that all providers may not measure demand on the same scale:
ISPs focus on bandwidth consumption and express demand in bytes, while
CPs are concerned with content consumption and/or advertising revenues,
thus expressing demand in number of clicks or products sold (books, music
albums, etc.). However, using a single demand metric is very convenient
for our purposes here, and other metrics can be approximated from this one
using an appropriate scaling factor.
In what follows, we furthermore suppose that users are only concerned
with the total usage-based price they are charged, i.e., they don’t care
whether they are giving money to an ISP or a CP. Equal demand sensi-
tivies to price ensue, i.e., d1 = d2 = d. Since D ≥ 0, define the maximum
price
pmax :=
Dmax
d
≥ p1i + p2j.
2.2 Customer Stickiness
As we suppose all providers of a given type propose the same type/quality
of content/service, user decisions are only based on price considerations. For
example, if an ISP charges a price significantly lower than the other ISPs, in
the long run all customers will choose it and the others will have no choice
but to align their prices or opt out of the game. Therefore, our homogeneity
hypothesis means all n1 ISPs (and similarly all n2 CPs) have roughly the
same prices:
p11 ≈ p12 ≈ · · · ≈ p1n1 ,
p21 ≈ p22 ≈ · · · ≈ p2n2 .
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As providers play the usage-based pricing game, first-order differences be-
tween these prices may appear (e.g.,
the ith ISP reducing his price by δp1i to attract new end users). Consumers
are then more likely to go to the cheapest providers of each type, but price
differences may be too small to convince all of them to move and some will
stay with their current provider. This phenomenon is known as customer
stickiness, inertia or loyalty. To model it, we define the fraction σki of users
committed to the ith provider of the kth type (k = 1 for ISPs and 2 for CPs)
as a function of pk = (pk1, . . . , pknk), i.e., σki := σ(i,pk). Properties expected
of the “stickiness function” σ include:
(a) σ(i,pk) ≥ 0 and ∑nkj=1 σ(j,pk) = 1;
(b) if pk = (p, p, . . . , p), then ∀i ∈ {1, ..., nk},
σ(i,pk) = 1/nk; and
(c) pki < pkj ⇒ σ(i,pk) > σ(j,pk).
In other words, the distribution is uniform if all providers of a given type
charge exactly the same price, and ensures otherwise that cheaper providers
attract more consumers. We chose the following model which satisfies these
properties:
σ(i,pk) =
1/pki∑nk
j=1 1/pkj
=: σki, (1)
The average usage-based price charged by a provider of type k for a customer
is then pk :=
∑
i σkipki, i.e., the harmonic mean of {pki}i.
2.3 Non-discriminating setting
In a “neutral” setting with no side payments nor application discrimination,
the ith ISP’s expected usage-based revenue is given by
U1i =
n2∑
j=1
σ1i σ2j D(p1i, p2j) p1i = σ1iD(p1i, p2) p1i,
and similarly U2j for the j
th CP. Then,
∂U1i
∂p1i
=
−σ1i∑
j 6=i
1
p1j
− 1
pmax − p1i − p2
+
1
p1i
U1i.
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A necessary condition for an interior equilibrium is ∂U1i
∂p1i
(p1, p2) = 0, which in
this case yields (n1 + 1)p1 + p2 = pmax. Combining with the similar condition
for CPs, we get a non-singular linear system whose solution is
p∗k =
n3−k
n1n2 + n1 + n2
pmax for k = 1, 2.
Demand and revenues are then given by
D∗ =
n1n2
n1n2 + n1 + n2
Dmax,
U∗ki =
n23−k
(n1n2 + n1 + n2)2
Umax,
for k = 1, 2 and i ∈ J1, nkK. This solution is actually a Nash Equilibrium
Point (NEP) since
∂2Uki
∂pki2
(p∗1, p
∗
2) =
−2U∗ki
p∗k(pmax − p∗1 − p∗2)
< 0,
which means it is a local maximum in revenue for all players.
As expected, customers benefit from competition among the providers.
See Figure 1a. With 2 ISPs and 2 CPs, demand is only 50% of its potential
Dmax, while it is about 70% of Dmax with 5 ISPs and 5 CPs. This base model
also encompasses two expected behaviors: providers of one type benefit from
increased competition among those of the other, while their revenues are
significantly reduced by increased competition in their own group (see Figure
1b). Note that competition in a provider’s own group has much greater
impact on their income than competition in the other.
3 Side Payments
Suppose now that there are side payments between the two types of providers.
We introduce a usage-based fee ps from the CPs to the ISPs. When ps > 0,
CPs remunerate the ISPs, e.g., to support the bandwidth costs or share in
advertising revenue4. On the other hand, if ps < 0, ISPs give money to the
CPs, e.g., for copyright remuneration. We suppose ISPs or CPs receive side
4Advertising in delivered content is arguably not specifically requested by end-users.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium demand and ISP revenues as functions of n1 and n2
(CP revenues are symmetric). In (a), black means 85% of Dmax while white
is 50% of Dmax. In (b), black is 10% of Umax and white 0.5% of Umax.
payments collectively and ultimately share the aggregate amount proportion-
ally to their customer shares. Hence, provider revenues become:
U1i = σ1iD(p1i, p2)(p1i + ps), i ∈ {1, ..., n1},
U2j = σ2jD(p1, p2j)(p2j − ps), j ∈ {1, ..., n2},
where all demand and price factors are non-negative.
It is expected that ps is not a decision variable for any player or group
of players. Indeed, since revenues are monotonic in ps, those controlling
it would always be incented to increase or decrease it (if they are ISPs or
CPs respectively), leading the other players to opt out of the competition.
Therefore, ps would normally be regulated and we will consider it a fixed
parameter from now on.
Necessary conditions for an interior equilibrium (null first-derivatives of
revenues) yield: [
p1
pmax − p1 − p2
− 1
n1
]
(p1 + ps) + ps = 0, (2)[
p2
pmax − p1 − p2
− 1
n2
]
(p2 − ps)− ps = 0. (3)
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With the introduction of non-null ps, this system is now not linear. So, we
begin with a study of a simplified setting where n1 = n2 = 2.
3.1 Study of the 2 ISPs, 2 CPs case
First, define x := p1/pmax, y := p2/pmax and s := ps/pmax. We can rewrite
equilibrium conditions as
− 3x2 − s− xy + ys− (s− 1)x = 0, (4)
−3y2 + s− xy − xs+ (s+ 1)y = 0. (5)
Now, change variables to u := x+y and v := x−y to simplify these conditions
to
− 2sv − 2u2 − v2 + u = 0, (6)
−3uv − 2s+ v = 0, (7)
where (6) = (4) + (5) and (7) = (4) − (5). Equilibrium prices, demand and
revenues are now solvable in closed form5. An important observation we can
make at this point is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. When n1 = n2 = 2, there is an interior NEP iff∣∣∣∣∣ pspmax
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxx∈[ 1
4
, 1
2
]
√
(1− x)(1− 2x)2(4x− 1)
36x
≈ 4.64%.
In other words, regulated side payments can only occur to a small extent
(|ps| < 4.64% of pmax), otherwise there will be no interior NEP, which means
one of the two groups of players will opt out of the usage-based pricing game.
Proof. Define a := s/v + 1/2. Then, equation (7) yields
u =
2
3
(1− a). (8)
Expressing u and v as functions of a in (6), and given that a 6= 1
2
(v is finite),
we have the following necessary condition:
(6s)2 =
1
a
(1− a)(2a− 1)2(4a− 1),
5These expressions are complicated and of no extra-computational interest.
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which we can rewrite as
|s| = |2a− 1|
6
√(
1
a
− 1
)
(4a− 1) =: g(a). (9)
Now, let us derive necessary conditions of the domains where our variables
live.
• (0 < x, y < 1): revenues are positive;
• (0 < u < 1): demand is positive;
• (−1 < v < 1): x and y are in ]0, 1[;
• (−1
2
< a < 0) or (1
4
≤ a ≤ 1): comes from (8) and (9);
• (1
4
≤ a ≤ 1): |v| < 1 means that |a − 1/2| > |s|. Replacing |s| by
expression (9) yields (1/a − 1)(4a − 1) < 9, which is impossible when
−1
2
< a < 0.
• (1
4
≤ a ≤ 1
2
): suppose a > 1
2
and s > 0. From expression (9), we then
have
s >
1
3
(1− a)(2a− 1) ⇒ u < v ⇒ y < 0,
which is impossible. Similarly, a > 1
2
and s < 0 would imply x < 0.
According to (9), |s| cannot be greater than the maximum value of g on
[
1
4
, 1
2
]
,
which is ≈ 4.6%. We showed that this condition is necessary: one can check
with no harm that it is also sufficient, i.e., any value of |s| ≤ max{g(a), a ∈
[1
4
, 1
2
]} yields two possible values for a, which in turn give two set of prices
x, y corresponding to positive equilibrium demand and revenues.
There are two solutions to (2) and (3). For any solution p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2) to
this system,
∂2Uki
∂pki2
(p∗) =
−2Uki(p∗)
(p∗k + (−1)k+1ps)(pmax − p∗1 − p∗2)
< 0 for k = 1, 2,
given that p∗k + (−1)k+1ps > 0 for k = 1, 2 (in a valid solution, players paying
side payments cannot get negative revenues). Thus, both the critical points
we computed are also interior Nash Equilibrium Points (NEPs).
Generally, additional NEPs may exist on the boundary of the play-action
space. Demand and revenues at NEP1 and NEP2 are shown in Figures 2a and
2b. Note that
10
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Figure 2: Demand and revenues at NEP1 and NEP2.
• NEP1 is consistent with the results of the non-discriminating setting:
when s = 0, p∗k = pmax/4, D
∗ = Dmax/2 and U i∗k = Umax/16 for k =
1, 2. Otherwise, ps has a rather unexpected impact on equilibrium
revenues: more side payments yield decreased revenues for those who
receive them.
• NEP2 does not exist when s = 0 (there is a discontinuity in equilibrium
prices at this point). Again, providers receiving side payments even-
tually get much less revenues than the others. Yet, unlike NEP1, here
their revenues increase with ps.
Both interior NEPs share the same “paradox”: providers receiving side pay-
ments eventually achieve less revenue than the others.
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3.2 Convergence to equilibrium
Here we take s > 0 (the roles of ISPs and CPs are swapped for s < 0). As-
sume all providers act independently under a best-response behavior. Thus,
the vector field
(p1, p2) 7→
(
∂U1i
∂p1i
(p1, p2),
∂U2j
∂p2j
(p1, p2)
)
is an appropriate indicator of the aggregate “trends” of the system, see Figure
3. So, if p1 > p
∗
1(NEP2), the system is attracted by NEP1; otherwise, unless
p1 is precisely equal to p
∗
1(NEP2), the system is attracted to the boundary
NEPB (where usage-based revenues for ISPs come only from side payments),
i.e., NEP2 is an unstable (saddle) point.
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p
2
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NEPB
Figure 3: “Macroscopic” trends of the system for n1 = n2 = 2 and s = 4%.
Solving (3) with p1 = 0 yields
p∗2(NEPB) =
pmax
6
(
1 + s+
√
s2 + 14s+ 1
)
,
where corresponding expressions for demand and revenues follow directly.
At the boundary NEPB, demand is higher than at NEP1 or NEP2 while ISP
revenues turn out to be lower (and CP revenues higher) than at NEP2 (see
Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Demand and revenues at NEPB.
3.3 Generalization to n1 = n ISPs and n2 = n CPs
When there are the same number n of CPs and ISPs, necessary conditions
for a NEP can be written as follows (using the change of variables of section
3.1):
2u(1− u)− 2nsv − n(u2 + v2) = 0,
nu(s− v)− 2s(n+ u− 1)− uv + v = 0.
This system is tractable for any n ≥ 2. We computed its solutions for all
n < 10 and observed that the conclusions of the n = 2 study above also hold
for greater values of n, i.e.,
• there are two interior NEPs: one (NEP2) is repulsive (the aggregate
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behavior of one group of providers is to avoid it) while the other one
(NEP1) is attractive;
• if side payment receivers k have a mean price pk > p∗k(NEP2), the system
will converge to NEP1; otherwise, it will go to a border equilibrium
NEPB where they have a null usage-based price;
• equilibrium demand and revenue curves share the shape of those on
Figures 2a and 2b, scaled by a factor depending on n.
Additional details can be found at [15]. The number n of providers impacts
the maximum value of |s| (see Theorem 1) and scales equilibrium prices,
demand and revenues. Sample figures are given in Table 1.
n max |s| min D∗
Dmax
max D
∗
Dmax
max p
∗
pmax
max U
∗
Umax
2 4.7% 50% 66% 36% 11%
3 2.2% 60% 75% 27% 6.2%
4 1.3% 67% 80% 22% 4.0%
5 0.83% 71% 83% 19% 2.8%
6 0.59% 75% 86% 16% 2.0%
7 0.44% 77% 87% 14% 1.6%
8 0.34% 80% 88% 13% 1.3%
9 0.27% 81% 90% 11% 1.0%
Table 1: Impact of n on equilibria properties.
3.4 Summary
For reasonable values of the number of competing providers, we saw that the
introduction of side payments in the model yielded a game with two possible
outcomes:
• If initial prices of side payment receivers are high enough, providers
will reach an equilibrium where receivers get less revenue than payers
(the higher the side payments, the lower the revenue). Yet, this is the
best compromise for them.
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• Otherwise, receivers will be constrained into setting their usage-based
fees to zero, depending only on side payments for their usage-based
revenues. This is the worst solution for them.
In both cases, the paradox of side payments is that they act as a handicap
for those who receive them.
4 Application neutrality
Now, let us consider to what extent ISPs should be allowed to perform price
discrimination depending on the application in use (e.g., video chat, media
streaming)? In this section, we study the impact of such discrimination in a
configuration with two crude example types of applications: web surfing and
P2P file sharing.
4.1 Additional problem set-up
We extend our model to a setting with three types of providers:
1. ISPs, providing last-mile access to the Internauts,
2. Web Content Providers (Web CPs), e.g., search engine portals (recall
all providers of any given type are deemed identical, so we assume all
Web CPs provide the same type of client-server HTTP content as well),
and
3. P2P Content Providers (P2P CPs), e.g., private P2P networks operated
in cooperation with copyright holders.
Users choose an ISP, a Web CP and a P2P CP. To access web (resp. P2P)
content, they pay usage-based fees to both their ISP and their Web CP
(resp. P2P CP). These groups are not coalitions: in a group, each provider
acts independently to maximize their own revenue.
In a neutral setting, the ith ISP charges a single price p1i for all types of
traffic, while otherwise it may set up two different prices p12,i and p13,i for
HTTP and P2P traffic respectively. Denote by p2j (resp. p3j) the usage-
based price charged by the jth Web CP (resp. P2P CP). We introduce two
separate demand-response profiles for the two types of content: when ISP i,
15
Web CP j and P2P CP l are chosen, demands for HTTP and P2P content
are, respectively,
D2 = D2max − d2(p12,i + p2j),
D3 = D3max − d3(p13,i + p3l),
with p12,i = p13,i = p1i in the neutral setting. As previously, define pkmax :=
Dkmax/dk.
The portion of users committed to the ith provider of the kth group is still
modeled as (1); we will see in 4.4 how to generalize this to ISPs charging two
different prices instead of one. Revenues for ISP i, Web CP j and P2P CP l
are given by
U1i = σ1i (D2 p12,i +D3 p13,i),
U2j = σ2j D2 p2j,
U3l = σ3lD3 p3l.
Finally, we define the normalized sensitivity to usage-based pricing α and
the maximum prices ratio γ,
α :=
d2
d2 + d3
and γ :=
p2max
p3max
, (10)
and make the following assumptions:
• α ≥ 1/2 ⇔ d2 > d3: consumers are more sensitive to usage-based
pricing for web content than for file sharing.
• γ < 1 ⇔ p2max < p3max: customers are ready to pay more for content
exchanged on P2P sharing systems (movies, music, etc.) than for web
pages.
4.2 Monopolistic players
Now assume there is only one ISP, one Web CP and one P2P CP. This is the
case when, in any group, either there is no competition or all providers have
decided to form a coalition. Closed solutions are easy to derive here.
In the non-neutral setting, the ISP plays two independent “ISP vs. CP”
games and the equilibrium is thus given by
p∗1k = p
∗
k =
pkmax
3
; D∗k =
Dkmax
3
; U∗k =
Ukmax
9
16
for k = 2, 3, with U∗1 = U
∗
2 + U
∗
3 . See [1] for further discussion of the “ISP
vs. CP” game.
In the neutral setting, the ISP has to find a compromise between the two
applications, which is at the NEP
p∗1 = α
p2max
3
+ (1− α) p3max
3
. (11)
Let us define ∆max := p3max − p2max and µ := 21/d2+1/d3 the harmonic mean of
d2 and d3. Equilibrium prices set by the two other providers are
p∗2 =
p2max
3
− (1− α) ∆max
6
; p∗3 =
p3max
3
+ α
∆max
6
.
Neutrality yields lower demand for web content and higher demand for file
sharing:
D∗k =
Dkmax
3
− (−1)kµ∆max
12
for k = 2, 3.
Equilibrium revenue for the ISP is
U∗1 =
(D2max +D3max)
2
9(d2 + d3)
<
U2max
9
+
U3max
9
,
less than in the non-neutral setting. Other players’ revenues are given by
U∗k =
Ukmax
18
(
1− (−1)kµ∆max
D2max
)2
for k = 2, 3.
These expressions show that, while the P2P CP is better off in a neutral
setting, both the ISP and the Web CP prefer the non-neutral configuration
(see Figure 5). Also, an interesting fact to point out is that p3max cannot be
too high:
Theorem 2. In the neutral setting with monopolistic providers, there is an
interior NEP iff
p3max <
(
1 +
2
1− α
)
p2max. (12)
Proof. (12) is equivalent to p∗2 > 0. If it does not hold, the Web CP will
have no choice but to set his usage-based price to zero, thus opting out of
the game.
This condition is a consequence of the “compromise” sought by the ISP:
if p3max  p2max, equation (11) tells us p∗1 will be greater than the maximum
price consumers are ready to pay for web content.
17
30%D2max30%D3max
D ∗2
D ∗3
10%U2max 15%U3max
U ∗1
U ∗2
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Neutral
Non-neutral
Figure 5: Impact of regulation with monopolistic providers (α = .8 and
γ = .4).
4.3 Neutral setting
Here consider the setting of non-monopolistic providers (i.e., nk > 1 for
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}) where application neutrality is enforced. In particular, U1i =
σ1i(D2 +D3)p1i. Utilities’ derivatives are then:
∂U1i
∂p1i
(p1, p2, p3) =
[
1
n1p1
− 1
αD˜2 + (1− α)D˜3
]
U1i,
∂Uki
∂pki
(p1, p2, p3) =
[
1
nkpk
− 1
D˜k
]
Uki for k = 2, 3,
where D˜k := Dk/dk = pkmax − p1 − pk for k = 2, 3. Therefore, a NEP must
be solution to the linear system:
(n1 + 1) p1 + αp2 + (1− α) p3 = αp2max + (1− α) p3max,
p1 + (n2 + 1) p2 = p2max,
p1 + (n3 + 1) p3 = p3max,
18
whose resolution is straightforward. For any solution p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) of this
system,
∂2U1i
∂p1i2
(p∗) =
−2U1i(p∗)
p1(αD˜2 + (1− α)D˜3)
< 0
∂2Uki
∂pki2
(p∗) =
−2Uki(p∗)
pkD˜k
< 0 for k = 2, 3,
ensuring that p∗ is indeed a NEP.
4.4 Non-neutral setting
When application non-neutral pricing is allowed, the ith ISPs utility is U1i =
σ1i(D2p12,i + D3p13,i), where σ1i refers to the portion of users gathered by
ISP i given his prices p12,i and p13,i. There are different ways to generalize
equation (1) to multiple criteria: e.g., one could apply σ to the mean price
(p12,i + p13,i)/2 or model σ1i as a convex combination of σ12,i and σ13,i. We
chose
σ1i := σ(i, p˜1) =
1/p˜1i∑n1
j=1 1/p˜1j
(13)
where p˜1i :=
√
αγ p12,i + (1 − √αγ) p13,i. That is, we apply the original
stickiness model (1) to a combined price p˜1i defined as a convex combination
of p12,i and p13,i. This choice, particularly the geometric mean
√
αγ in (13),
is motivated by the following considerations: σ1i still satisfies the properties
expected for a stickiness function (see section 2); the weight of p12,i in the
combination is increasing in p2max and d2, and similarly the weight of p13,i is
increasing in p3max and d3; and the resulting model is solvable in closed form.
In this model, utilities’ derivatives for CPs are the same as in 4.3 (regu-
lations only affect the ISPs) while
∂U1i
∂p12,i
=
[
α (D˜2 − p12)
αD˜2p12 + (1− α)D˜3p13
−
(
1− 1
n1
) √
αγ
p˜1i
]
U1i,
∂U1i
∂p13,i
=
[
(1− α) (D˜3 − p13)
αD˜2p12 + (1− α)D˜3p13
−
(
1− 1
n1
)
1−√αγ
p˜1i
]
U1i.
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Thus, any Nash equilibrium satisfies:
α√
αγ
(D˜2 − p12) =
n1 − 1
n1p˜1
(αD˜2p12 + (1− α)D˜3p13),
=
1− α
1−√αγ (D˜3 − p13),
p12 + (n2 + 1) p2 = p2max,
p13 + (n3 + 1) p3 = p3max,
where p˜1 :=
√
αγ p12 + (1 − √αγ) p13. This system can be rewritten as
two polynomial equations in p12 and p13 which are solvable in closed form.
Computations yield a single admissible solution p∗ = (p∗12, p
∗
13, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) here,
for which
∂2U1i
∂p12,i2
(p∗) =
−2αU1i(p∗)
αD˜2p12 + (1− α)D˜3p13
< 0,
and similarly for ∂
2U1i
∂p13,i2
(p∗) with 2(1− α) instead of 2α. As in 4.3, ∂2U2j
∂p2j2
(p∗)
and ∂
2U3l
∂p3l2
(p∗) are negative as well, ensuring that p∗ is indeed a Nash equilib-
rium of the game.
4.5 Discussion of experimental results
In most of our numerical experiments, we compared revenues at this NEP
with those of the neutral scenario for α = 0.8 and γ = 0.3. We used Sage
[16] for our computations, and all our scripts are available at [15].
First, the trend we observed in subsection 4.2 (ISPs and Web CPs prefer
the non-neutral setting while P2P CPs benefit from neutrality regulations)
also holds when the model encompasses competition (see Figure 6).
The impact of non-neutral pricing on providers’ revenues varies with com-
petition: increased competition brings less benefit for Web CPs and less loss
for P2P CPs. Yet, competition has almost no effect on the gains of ISPs (see
Figure 7).
We also observed a maximum price gap, as we did in subsection 4.2 with
Theorem 2, which decreases when competition increases.
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Figure 6: Revenues for providers in different settings (n is the number of
providers of each type, α = 0.8 and γ = 0.3). Plain (resp. hatched) columns
correspond to neutral (resp. non-neutral) settings.
5 Conclusions
We presented an idealized framework to study the impact of two net-neutrality
related issues, side payments and application neutrality, on the interactions
among end users, ISPs and CPs. Our revenue model relied on a simple,
common linear demand response to usage-based prices, and it accounted for
customer loyalty.
We studied the effect of regulated side payments between the ISPs and
CPs. The two possible outcomes of the competition both showed the same
paradox: side payments are actually a handicap for those who receive them
insofar as they reduce Nash equilibrium revenues.
We also studied the issue of application neutrality in a simple setting in-
volving two types of content, web content and file sharing, the latter showing
lower price sensitivity and higher willingness to pay under our assumptions
of relative demand sensitivity to price. Our analysis suggested that ISPs
and Web CPs benefit from application non-neutral practices, while providers
that enable content dissemination by P2P means are better off in a neutral
setting.
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Figure 7: Relative variation in revenue, i.e., the ratio of revenues (non-neutral
- neutral)/neutral at the NEP, where n is the number of providers of each
type, α = 0.8 and γ = 0.3.
5.1 Future Work
Our current framework does not take into account additional advertising
revenues that CPs may receive, e.g., to lower their usage-based prices, or even
deliver their content for free. There are multiple ways to remediate this. In
[1], we chose to add a fixed parameter pa, so that UCP = (pCP+pa−ps)D. The
underlying hypothesis is that pa is the outcome of a separate game played
between advertisers and content providers. However, advertisers’ willingness
to pay may also depend on consumers’ demand D, and is likely to increase
significantly when targeted advertising becomes possible.
One way to remediate the shortcomings of fixed pa is to add advertisers
to the game, reacting to prices {pa,i} set by CPs in a way similar to con-
sumers, i.e., with linear demand-response and advertiser stickiness. Their
demand Da should be increasing with consumers’ demand, and decreasing
with pa, e.g., Da = D−dapa (CPs’ revenues being UCP = paDa+(pCP−ps)D).
Also, when there are sundry types of applications, their respective levels of
targeted advertising could be taken into account with da,i depending on ap-
plication i. Though harder to solve, such a system would encompass another
major component of the Internet economy.
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